Security policy

Report vulnerabilities privately to volpestyle+bot@gmail.com. Do not put exploit details, credentials, private message content, or user-session tokens in a public issue.

Clankie's current security boundaries are:

• The clankie service and native producer/listener ports bind to loopback.
• Local services authenticate with brokered bearers. The remote relay requires a live device session with the chat grant on every request and tail poll.
• The credential broker is canonical for provider, Discord, mailbox, and internal credentials. Compatibility model/media provider keys may come from the process environment; logs and public protocol results remain secret-free.
• Discord, attachments, generated media responses, browser content, and model output are untrusted input. Machine tools reach Discord only through owner grants (systemActorUserIds, and optionally trusted guilds/channels). An individually granted actor in a shared room gets a one-shot tool-bearing turn; official-bot DMs and trusted guilds own a durable tool-bearing lane. Voice is as capable as the room it is in.
• Bot and personal-lab Discord credentials live in separate processes. The user-session body is off by default and requires explicit owner opt-in.
• Vox is a separate native process behind validated, bounded IPC.

High-priority reports include authentication bypass, cross-device or cross-channel disclosure, credential exposure, unsafe attachment/media fetches, Discord allowlist or consent bypass, native media parser issues, and any path that gives untrusted input machine tools.

For containment, stop affected services with clankie down, preserve the mode-0600 state logs without publishing them, revoke affected provider or Discord credentials, rotate the operator bearer with clankie operator-credential rotate, and revoke paired devices with clankie devices revoke <id>.